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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEONARD J. HUDSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FLOYD W. DECKER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 8655 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
N~TURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff and appel-
lant, hereinafter called the Plaintiff, from a di-
rected verdict in favor of the defendant and respon-
dent, hereinafter called the Defendant. The action 
was brought by the Plaintiff, a guest in the auto-
mobile of the Defendant at the time of an automobile 
accident, under the Idaho Guest Statute, that being 
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the state in which the accident occurred. Plain-
tiff proved that the automobile driven by the De-
fendant down a canyon and around a curve at a 
moderate rate of speed left the highway and rolled 
down a dugway on the side of the road. The ques-
tion is whether or not that evidence was sufficient 
to raise an issue for the jury under the allegation 
of plaintiff's complaint that "the defendant drove 
his said automobile in such an unlawful manner 
and with such reckless and wanton disregard for 
the safety of the plaintiff that said automobile 
overturned and plaintiff was severely injured as 
hereinafter more particularly alleged" (R. 2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no substantial dispute between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant as to what the evi-
dence shows the facts to be and we would concur 
in a general way w·ith \vhat the Plaintiff has said 
those facts are in his brief filed herein. However, 
it may be helpful to the court for the Defendant 
to briefly reYie\v the background of the accident 
and point out that eYidence which he feels is par-
ticularly iluportant. In doing so the Defendant will 
adopt the san1e procedure used by the Plaintiff and 
will refer to the first volun1e of the record as 
( R. ______ ) and tht~ second volun1e of the record as 
(T. ______ ). 
Plaintiff and Defendant, en1ployees of the 
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United States Air Force Base at Hill Field, Utah, 
were temporarily assigned to the Larson Air Force 
Base Moses Lake Washington for one month's duty, 
' ' extending from May 17, 1955 to June 17, 1955. 
Defendant desired company for the return auto-
mdbile trip to the parties' residences in Utah and 
requested Plaintiff to ride with him. 
On June 17, 1955 Plaintiff and Defendant, 
in Defendant's 1950 Plymouth sedan, drove from 
Moses Lake, Washington to Spokane, Washington 
where they lodged over-night; and then about five 
o'clock A.M. on June 18, 1955 commenced driving 
from Spokane, Washington to the place in Idaho 
where the accident occurred. Defendant drove and 
Plaintiff was a non-paying guest passenger (see 
Plaintiff's complaint, R. 1, 2, 3 and Plaintiff's 
Brief, pp 2-3). There were a number of other em-
ployees in other cars who left ~IIoses Lake, Wash-
ington about the same time as the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, many of them taking different routes. 
The witnesses, Harmon W. Cheney and James 
L. Larsen, and others were following the same route 
al!d vvrere apparently behind the Decker vehicle (T. 
17-18). Between Idaho and Montana they were some 
ten minutes behind (T. 18) but caught the Decker 
vehicle before they got to Missoula, Montana in the 
forenoon of June 18, 1955 (T. 18). The two ve-
hicles became separated again in Missoula, where 
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the witnesses remained close to three-quarters of 
an hour (T. 19). The witnesses were apparently 
catching the Decker vehicle at the time of the ac-
cident as they arrived at the scene of the accident 
approximately ten minutes after it had occurred 
(T. 20). They had driven at a speed of around 60 
miles per hour between Missoula and this point, 
just over the Montana-Idaho border on U. S. High-
way 93 (T. 20-50). 
U. S. Highway 93, which runs between Mis-
soula, Montana and Salmon, Idaho, is straight and 
level for several miles until just before it reaches 
the Idaho border coming from the north, where the 
road enters a group of mountains which are a part 
of the Rocky Mountain Range (T. 33) and which 
also constitute the Continental Divide (T. 33) and 
the border line between Idaho and Montana. The 
road reaches its highest point at Lost Trail Pass 
( T. 51) and then starts down a canyon. As the 
road descends on the Idaho side there are a couple 
of curves which are not too severe before it reaches 
the point where this accident occurred (T. 21). 
The Defendant, Floyd W. Decker, testified 
that as he started down from the top of the pass he 
was traveling between 30 and 40 miles per hour and 
continued driving at such speed until immediately 
before the accident (T. 51). As he approached the 
immediate area where the accident occurred there 
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were two rather bad curves (T. 52). The witness 
was going around 30 to 40 miles per hour as he 
came to the first curve, but by the time he came 
to the second he had reduced his speed to between 
5 and 10 miles per hour (T. 53-54), at which point 
his automobile left the highway. 
The second curve is pictured in Exhibits C, D 
and E, which pictures were all taken looking down 
the canyon, the direction in which the Decker ve-
hicle was traveling ( T. 16) . 
'The witness Harmon W. Cheney has identified 
the track shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit D, which is 
marked with an "x", as the path which was ap-
parently followed by the Decker vehicle in going off 
the road as it failed to complete the turn. He has 
made an "x" on Plaintiff's Exhrbit C which is the 
location in which the vehicle which he was driving 
was parked when they arrived at the scene of the 
accident. Exhibits F and G are pictures of the 
Decker vehicle as it came to rest after going off the 
highway (T. 11). 
The Plaintiff, Leonard J. Hudson, testified 
that as they were traveling down the canyon they 
had slowed down to pass some trucks, and at the 
time they passed the trucks he turned around to get 
a road map from the back seat and that just as he 
turned around to the front seat again Mr. Decker 
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said, "Duck", and they went over the bank (T. 
164). Immediately after passing the trucks they 
were traveling at a speed of about 40 miles per 
hour, but he did not continue to watch the speed-
ometer, and while he knew they had slowed down 
considerably he did not know exactly what speed 
they were traveling when the car went over the 
bank ( R. 64-65) . 
One of the witnesses, James L. Larsen, stated 
that the shoulder on the edge of the road where the 
Decker car went off was very narrow and appeared 
to be fairly soft (T. 44-45) . 'The shoulder in the 
vicinity of where the car vvent off was messed up 
to some extent and there was not more than a foot 
or two of shoulder ( T. 45) . And at one time he 
estimated the width to be six inches ( T. 45). 
The witness, Harmon W. Cheney, stated that 
the oiled surface of the highway in the vicinity of 
the curve was covered with loose sand or fine gravel 
extending from a point half way to the center line 
to the edge of the road, and as he drove around this 
curve at the time he arrived he was definitely aware 
of the fact that his car was traveling through sand 
and gravel and could feel it under the \Vheels of his 
car (T. 28-29). 
The rest of the evidence concerns the damage 
to the Decker vehicle and the injuries which Plain-
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tiff may have sustained and other matters not per-
tinent to the question of liability. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the Defen-
dant moved for a directed verdict in his favor, which 
was granted by the court. The court in directing 
its verdict concluded: 
" ... there is no evidence in this case 
which has been introduced by the plaintiff, 
or any evidence at all in the case, which the 
Court feels justified submitting the case to 
the jury on the theory that the plaintiff 
evidenced a reckless disregard for the safety 
of his guest, in the operation of his vehicle, 
at the time and in the locality where the ac-
cident took place. There may have been 
negligence on the part of the defendant, but 
if that negligence did exist it didn't amount 
to wilful misconduct. The Court feels further 
that to submit this case to the jury would 
have permitted the jury to conjecture, by in-
ference and otherwise, to the causation of the 
accident, which does not appear with any 
degree of certainty in the record, and there-
fore the Court feels the motion is well taken." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR 
THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO RAISE A JURY QUESTION ON THE 
ISSUE OF LIABILITY. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR 
THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO RAISE A JURY QUESTION ON THE 
ISSUE OF LIABILITY. 
We do not disagree with the statement in Plain-
tiff's Brief to the effect that few things are more 
devastating to a trial lawyer than a directed verdict. 
We might suggest, however, that a rule more fun-
damental and vital to our system of law is the rule 
that liability should not be imposed upon an in-
dividual without fault. Nor would we contend that 
if the trial judge has serious doubts as to whether 
a Motion For Directed Verdict is well taken he 
might submit the case to the jury and then, if he 
thinks it improper, set aside the verdict as against 
the weight of the evidence. However, if the trial 
judge is convinced, prior to the time that the case 
is submitted to the jury, that if the jury should 
return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff he would 
have to set the same aside and enter a judgment, 
notwithstanding the verdict, in favor of the defen-
dant, then the court would be requiring the jury to 
perform an act without any meaning or signifi-
ance, merely in the hope that the jury might agree 
with him and thus obviate the necessity of his grant-
ing the motion. 
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Nor do we take issue with the Plaintiff's argu-
ment to the effect that the court must consider and 
apply the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and if, in considering it in that light, 
the jury might reasonably find the issues in favor 
of the Plain tiff then the trial court should submit 
the issues to the jury. 
We would further agree that the Plain tiff has 
correctly stated the definition of Defendant's con-
duct on which liability must rest in this case, as de-
fined in the Idaho Guest Statute, section 49-1001, 
which provides: 
''No person transported by the owner 
or opera tor of a motor vehicle as his guest 
without payment for such transportation 
shall have a cause for damages against such 
owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, 
in case of accident, unless such accident shall 
have been intentional on the part of the said 
owner or operator or caused by his intoxica-
tion or his reckless disregard of the rights of 
others." 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the cases cited in 
Plaintiff's Brief, Forberg v. Harrison, 71 Idaho 11, 
225 P. (2d) 69, 71 and Turner v. Purdum (Idaho), 
289 P. (2d) 608, 611 has further explained the 
Idaho Statute as follows: 
"The term 'reckless disregard' as used 
in said section means an act or conduct 
destitute of heed or concern for consequences; 
especially foolishly heedless of danger, head-
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long rash; wan ton disregard, or conscious in-
difference to consequences." 
The fundamental question reduces itself to this: 
Was there sufficient evidence before the court from 
which the jury might reasonably have found that 
the Defendant in this case was guilty of wilful mis-
conduct or reckless disregard of the rights of others 
as that term has been defined by the Idaho Supreme 
Court? Since there was no evidence of any miscon-
duct on the part of the Defendant, except that the 
auto1nobile which he was driving at a moderate rate 
of speed ran off of the highway and turned over, 
the ultimate question is whether the jury might 
reasonably draw the inference from this that the 
Defendant was guilty of the required misconduct. 
In approaching this problem we must keep in 
mind the distinction between an affirmative act, 
which causes an accident, and the absence of any evi-
dence of any act, which may have caused an acci-
dent. It is for this reason that the case of Hebert 
v. Allen (Iowa), 41 N. W. (2d) 240 is not in point. 
In that case, the defendant, traveling 15 to 20 miles 
per hour on a straight road on a day which was 
clear and bright, there being no vehicles in sight 
and the terrain being flat and there being no un-
usual condition and no other reason shown, sud-
denly turned his car from the highway into a tele-
phone pole. It appears that there was no question 
10 
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in that case as to what caused the accident, the sud-
den and unexplained turning of the car. The jury 
was not, therefore, required to infer any course of 
conduct from the fact that the accident occurred. 
They are simply presented with the evidence that 
the driver, without any possible reason for doing 
so, suddenly turned his car off of a straight road 
in to a telephone pole, and they are asked to deter-
mine if that course of conduct in their opinion con-
stitutes "reckless operation of the car". Moreover, 
there was in that case some evidence that the car 
was deliberately turned into the telephone pole in 
an effort to scare passengers who were riding on 
the right running board of the car and who vvere 
pinned between the car and the running board at 
the time the car passed the telephone pole. 
The affirmative act in Orico v. Williams 
(Conn.), 97 A. ( 2d) 556 was the deliberate backing 
of an autor.aobile into a tree at a relatively high 
rate of speed. This case is also distinguishable in 
that the court in that case is talking about an infer-
ence of negligence rather than an inference of reck-
lessness. 
The case of Thompson v. Kost (Ky.), 194 S. 
W. (2d) 976 comes the nearest to sustaining Plain-
tiff's position, where the court held that negligence 
might be inferred when a car, traveling down a 
road, with no apparent reason to do so, suddenly 
11 
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swerved from one side of the road to the other and 
then over onto the other side of the road and off 
the road. However, again we are only speaking of 
negligence and there is again some evidence of other 
misconduct, the accident occurring at five o'clock 
A.M. and there being some evidence of drinking. 
The Montana court dismissed the problem 
rather summarily in Doheny v. Coverdale, 68 Pac. 
(2d) 142. In that case the car, which had appar-
ently been traveling on the right side of the road, 
turned to its left at an angle of approximately 45 
degrees and went off the road and headon into a 
large tree. When the other facts in the case are 
considered together with the evidence of affirma-
tively turning from a direct course on the highway, 
the decision appears to be based partly on a con-
sideration of other evidence. The four parties in 
the car at the time of the accident, two girls and two 
fellows, had been out all night and the accident oc-
curred at twenty minutes before fiYe o'clock in the 
morning. 
We agree with the Plaintiff that it is often im-
possible to show the mental attitude of an individual 
and the only thing that can be shown is the act, from 
which the mental attitude may be inferred. But we 
ask, from what act in this case are we to draw such 
an inference? The only evidence in this case is that 
the car, traveling around a curYe at a moderate 
12 
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speed, for some reason went off the highway and 
rolled down in to the canyon. There has been no 
proof of any circumstances that would show, or tend 
to show that the Defendant deliberately turned his 
vehicle off the highway, or that he drove around the 
curve at too high a rate of speed under the existing 
circumstances, or that he failed to exercise reason-
able control over his car, or that he drove his car 
when he was not in a fit condition to do so. The 
facetiousness of Plaintiff's argument is illustrated 
by the fact that while it is inferred throughout the 
entire Brief that the Defendant deliberately drove 
his vehicle off the side of the road, he, himself, is 
unable to make that inference and begins his argu-
ment on page 17 of his Brief: 
"Assume, for purpose of discussion only, 
that Defendant did in fact consciously and 
intentionally drive his automobile off the em-
bankment in this case." 
As was said in the case of Hewitt v. General 
Tire & Rubber Company, 3 Utah (2d) 354, 284 P. 
(2d) 471, in which the issue involved was mere 
negligence and not recklessness, 
"It is well settled that mere proof of an 
injury to plaintiff will not justify a verdict 
or judgment imposing liability upon the de-
fendant and if the evidence does not shQw any 
negligence on the part of the defendant, there 
can be no recovery, regardless of the fact that 
plaintiff was not negligent." 
13 
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There are a number of explanations, or infer-
ences if you will, as to how this accident may have 
happened. These may or may not have constituted 
negligence. Except for the last they surely do not 
constitute recklessness. The driver's attention may 
have been diverted to something he saw in the sur-
rounding area or by the activity of his companion 
who was turning around looking for something in 
the back seat. Something may have happened to 
the steering apparatus on his vehicle and he might 
thereafter have been unable to steer the car pro-
perly. Although only traveling at a moderate and 
reasonable rate of speed, that speed may have been 
too high a rate of speed for the particular curve in 
question and may have caused him to go off the side 
of t~e road. He may have reasonably gotten over 
to the side of the road and the shoulder n1ight have 
crumpled away beneath his car. He may have 
skidded on the gravel on the road in a manner not 
reasonably to be anticipated. He may have delibe-
rately driven his car off of the road. This last in-
ference, which is apparently the inference Plaintiff 
would have us 1nake, or at least permit the jury to 
make, requires that we find the Defendant, with no 
malice toward his friend or no other reason, would 
deliberately risk his own life and expose hin1self to 
serious injury. 
It should be noted that the Plaintiff in this 
14 
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case called the Defendant as an adverse witness. At 
such time he could have, had he chosen to do so, 
examined the Defendant on such matters as lookout, 
skidding, his control or lack of control over his 
vehicle, and other matters which may have explained 
this accident. His failure to do so can only be at-
tributed to two reasons. Either he was afraid of 
the answers he might get, that is, that the Defendant 
had a reasonable explanation for the accident; or he 
expected the Defendant to assume the burden of 
proving himself free from fault, the burden which 
he now attempts to impose upon the Defendant by 
this appeal, and was disappointed by Defendant's 
failure to undertake this burden. 
It is fundamental, as we have pointed out 
earlier in this Brief, that until there is evidence of 
conduct on the part of the Defendant which requires 
an explanation he should not be required to furnish 
such explanation. Nor is it proper to infer from the 
fact that the Defendant profers no explanation, 
where none is required, that he could not satisfact-
orily explain an event were he required to do so. 
vVe have addressed ourselves to this point in 
the Brief principally to the Plaintiff's failure to 
prove his case, which seems to presume that the 
Plaintiff may have been able to do so had he pro-
ceeded properly. The Record in this case warrants 
no such presumption. Viewed in its most logical 
lQ 
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light, the evidence simply discloses that the Defen-
dant, in driving his car at a moderate rate of speed 
down a canyon, lost control of the car on a curve 
and :ran off the side of the road and down an em-
bankment. As said by the trial judge, this may con-
stitute negligence but an analysis of the cases dis-
closes that it is not evidence of recklessness. 
In the case of Hollenbach v. Fairbanks (Colo.), 
287 P. ( 2d) 53, where a vehicle coming down a 
grade and around a curve skidded out of control to 
the wrong side of the road and down an embank-
ment, the court held that the mere occurrence of 
the accident does not imply negligence and the evi-
dence failed to establish that the driver of the truck 
acted in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of 
others within an automobile guest statute. 
In the case of Hawkins v. L. C. Jones Truck-
ing Company (Wyo.), 232 Pac. (2d) 1014 the evi-
dence was that the defendant permitted his auto-
mobile to skid from the right to the left side of the 
highway into the path of an approaching truck. 
The defendant did not remember so doing, and of-
fered no explanation. The eYidence was that the de-
fendant may have permitted his automobile to skid 
over onto the left side of the highway and into the 
path of an approaching truck. The court held this 
did not constitute recklessness, and in so doing 
16 
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quoted from cases which are appropriate here as 
follows: 
"In Burke v. Cook, 246 Mass. 518, 141 
N.E. 585, 586, the facts considered were 
these: The action was by a guest to recover 
from his automobile host for injuries sus-
tained in an accident which happened as fol-
lows: the motor car crossed a bridge over 
the Cape Cod canal going very slowly at a 
place only a short distance from the scene of 
the accident. The highway where the acci-
dent happened was a straight macadam road 
where there was clear vision for a long dis-
tance ahead. The only other traffic was a 
vehicle presently to be mentioned. There were 
no people and no intersecting roadways on 
this highway. After crossing the bridge the 
speed of the automobile increased until a team 
or truck was met or passed; a few seconds 
before the accident and while the car was 
'going fast' as one witness said and others 
said it was going 35 miles per hour and just 
as the other vehicle was passed there was a 
'thump, thump' noise from the right rear 
wheel and in a very short time, two or three 
seconds, the auton1obile went up in the air; 
turned over, struck on its top making a mark 
in the hardened road as of a car sliding on its 
top for three or four times its length. The 
record disclosed that 'Just before the accident 
the car seemed to be steering to the right ... 
the defendant turned his wheel to the left, and 
did it quickly, and (then) the car turned 
over.' The noise mentioned above indicated 
that there had been some trouble in the right 
rear wheel or its tire; after the accident one 
of the rear tires was found to have a long cut 
17 
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in it. In sustaining the defendant's excep-
tions the Court in part said: 
" ''The defendant by written motion re-
quested the direction of a verdict in his favor 
for the stated reason that there was no evi-
dence of gross negligence, and excepted to the 
failure to direct such a verdict. The case was 
submitted to the jury without any exception 
to the instructions actually given, and the 
plaintiff had a verdict. 
" 'Clearly, if this action can be main-
tained by proof of what is sometimes called 
ordinary negligence for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing it from gross negligence, there 
was a jury issue. The rate of speed, the quick 
turning of the automobile and its overturn, 
together were sufficient to justify a conclu-
sion founded on the failure to fulfill that 
duty. But confessedly the plaintiff cannot 
get on unless the evidence was sufficient to 
uphold a verdict based on gross negligence ... 
* * * 
" 'In the opinion of a majority of the 
court the speed of the car upon a roadway 
substantially free from traffic without in-
tersecting streets and without obstruction of 
vision, the passing of another vehicle in the 
manner described, the act of turning the 
wheel quickly to the left, and the turning over 
and sliding of the car as hereinbefore stated, 
whether considered separately or in conjunc-
tion, do not tend to prove such "indifference 
to present legal duty and utter forgetfulness 
of legal obligations so far as other persons 
may be affected" as to constitute "a heed-
less and palpable violation of legal duty" to 
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the plaintiff or ''a manifestly smaller amount 
of watchfulness and circumspection" than 
the circumstances required.' 
* * * 
"It was held in Loughran v. Nolan, 307 
Mass. 195, 29 N. E. 2d 737 that: A speed of 
30 to 35 miles an hour at which an automo-
bile was being operated on a dark, rainy after-
noon on a narrow, winding and slippery road 
would not, in and of itself, a1nount to 'gross 
negligence' which would render driver liable 
for injuries sustained by automobile guest, 
and also that in the guest's action against the 
driver for injuries sustained that the automo-
bile was being operated at the stated speed 
with road and weather conditions as related 
above, the skidding of the car over the side of 
a bridge and dropping into a river the fact 
that the automobile skidded did not warrant 
the finding of 'gross negligence' necessary to 
render the driver liable. 
* * * 
"In the case at bar Bechtold had driven 
for 50 miles on his own side of the road and 
without experiencing any trouble and until 
confronted with the situation disclosed at the 
scene of the accident if there was any cros-
sing of the center line of the highway it was 
done in the last 30 to 40 feet before the im-
pact of the collision and in a mere fraction 
of a second, at the speed the two vehicles were 
traveling. 
"Taking the case of the plaintiff in the 
most favorable view thereof as we are obliged 
to do we find Nlr. Long, the driver of the L. 
C. Jones Trucking Company's truck, stating 
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in substance that when the jeep was 50 feet 
in front of him it skidded and was out of 
control, but not over the center line of the 
highway; thereupon the driver got it under 
control for 10, 15 or 20 feet and then it 
skidded once more and this second time 
passed across the center line of the highway 
directly into his traffic lane. 
"This description of the accident hardly 
supplies any evidence that the driver of the 
jeep, Bechtold, was at fault in skidding into 
the path of the truck, nor do we find any 
other evidence in the record from which it 
could be so inferred ... " 
In the case of Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 
253 P. (2d) 240 it was held, in an action for the 
death of one riding as a guest in an automobile that 
the fact that the vehicle went over an embankment 
on the side of the highway, apparently in an attempt 
to avoid hitting horses on the highway, was not suf-
ficient to make a jury question as to whether the ac-
cident was caused by the defendant's reckless disre-
gard of the rights of others in operating the auto-
mobile. The court said: 
"There is no testimony as to the speed 
at which appellant was driYing prior to the 
accident, except that of Platz, \vho described 
it as "medium speed." This would tend to 
establish that, as far as speed is concerned, 
there was an absence of ordinary negligence. 
The evidence as to the skid marks, their 
length, the distance traYelled after going oYer 
the bank, and the gouge in the earth in the 
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right-of-way where it struck and inferentially 
bounced to the place where it carne to rest, is, 
of course, evidence of considerable speed. Al-
though the testimony of the defense witnesses 
would suggest that perhaps a part of the skid 
marks observed by the deputy sheriff may 
have been made by the Montague car. In any 
event, there is nothing in the record to indi-
cate that this car, travelling at 'medium' or 
moderate speed, operated over the course and 
in the manner it was operated, would not 
make the same marks over the same distance 
and otherwise behave as it did. Taken to-
gether with the testimony of Platz, who was 
close to, and saw the car when it was in mo-
tion, the whole evidence would be sufficient 
to go to the jury if the issue had been ordi-
nary negligence. But, we think it is wholly 
insufficient to support the claim of reckless 
disregard under the guest statute .... " 
Lastly, we have the case referred to in Plain-
tiff's Brief, Riccuiti v. Robinson, 2 Utah ( 2d) 45, 
269 P. (2d) 282, in which the evidence of reckless-
ness was much greater, in our opinion, than in the 
case at bar, and in which case it was held that the 
driver of a car, driven at a speed of 60 miles per 
hour which ran off the road when the driver 
dropped a cigarette, was not guilty of negligence. 
In the words of the court the facts were: 
"Plaintiff and a girl friend met defen-
dant and his friend at a tavern about mid-
night, and after making a round of several 
such places, after eating at one, and at about 
3 :30 a.m. the defendant drove the party over 
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a canyon road to a dam and returned to the 
city. The morning was dark, and although 
there was no snow on the streets, they were 
wet and a light snow was falling. Approach-
ing through a residential district where the 
speed limit was 30 m.p.h., and while the sleep-
ing girl in the front seat had her head in de-
fendant's lap, lighted cigarette fell from the 
latter's mouth into the folds of his clothing 
and in attempting to rid himself of it, and 
while sparks were flying, defendant lost con-
trol of his car. It jumped the curb, travelled 
along the lawned parking 192 feet, jumped 
several other driveway curbs, sideswiped 2 
trees, knocking the rear door off, returned to 
the highway and travelled another 183 feet 
before being stopped. There is evidence that 
defendant at one point on the parking applied 
his brakes, but there was no evidence of brake 
marks on the street either before the car 
jumped the curb or after it returned to the 
street .... Although we believe a proper 
foundation was not laid for this evidence, for 
the purposes of this case we may assume the 
car was tra veiling at 60 n1. p.h. at the time 
the accident occurred .... " 
The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and 
held: 
"Counsel for plaintiff concedes that the 
wilful n1isconduct conten1plated under our 
guest statute is 'the intentional doing of an 
act or intentional omitting or failing to do 
an act, with knowledge that serious injury 
is a probable and not merely a possible result, 
or the intentional doing of an act with wan-
ton and reckless disregard of the possible con-
sequences. 1 ' 
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"Under the facts of this case, a reason-
able person could not conclude that defendant 
intentionally did or failed to do an act that 
would fall within this definition. These peo-
ple were friends. There is no fact or com-
bination of facts in the record ·which showed 
a wan ton or reckless disregard of the conse-
quences, which in this case were a loss of con-
trol due solely to the accidental dropping of 
a lighted cigarette in the defendant's clothing 
and the car jumping the curb when defen-
dant tried to dispose of the lighted cigarette. 
The fact that the girl was asleep with her 
head in defendant's lap ·would seem to nega-
tive any reckless disregard by the latter for 
her well-being. The assumed fact that de-
fendant was travelling 60 m.p.h. in a resi-
dential zone was not a fact that would indi-
cate defendant had knowledge or any reason 
to believe that such speed probably or even 
possibly would result in a lighted cigarette 
accidentally falling out of his mouth. Such 
an event as v1ell could have occurred while 
travelling 25 m.p.h. in any kind of weather 
and in any speed zone. It was not the speed, 
but the dropping of a lighted cigarette that 
resulted in the loss of control, and this ac-
cidental and involuntary circumstances can-
not be said to be wilful misconduct under any 
reasonable theory or basis of fact. 
"Cases strikingly similar to the instant 
case are Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 
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P. 2d 732, 120 A. L. R. 1507, where the 
driver travelling 45-55 m.p.h., momentarily 
withdrew his attention from the road while 
turning a radio dial, Neyens v. Gehl, 235 
Iowa 115, 15 N. W. 2d 888, where, as here, 
the driver, travelling at 50-60 m.p.h. sought 
to retrieve a lighted cigarette he had dropped, 
and Rindge v. Holbrook, 111 Conn. 72, 149 
A. 231, where the driver momentarily lost 
control when a bee flew into the car. All hold 
that the driver host was not guilty of wilful 
misconduct towards his guest passenger .... " 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case shows the plaintiff 
was injured in an accident which occurred on the 
highway between Missoula, Montana and Salmon, 
Idaho. At that time the Plaintiff was admittedly 
a guest passenger in Defendant's automobile. The 
Defendant had driven from Moses Lake, Washing-
ton and there is not the slightest n1ention in the 
Record of his having done so in a reckless, or even 
a negligent, manner. As he was proceeding down 
hill and around a curve Defendant's car left the 
highway and rolled down the side of the bank. 
Plain tiff did not offer any other evidence showing 
the manner in which the accident occurred. It does 
appear from the Record, however, that other wit-
nesses had been able to negotiate the curve at the 
speed the Defendant was driving. It also appears 
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that the surface of the road at the point of the 
curve was covered with sand and gravel. 
There seems to be little question that the fore-
going does not constitute direct evidence of reck-
lessness as required by the Idaho Guest Statute to 
impose liability on the Defendant, and the Plaintiff 
does not so argue in his Brief. 
What Plaintiff does ask is that the court per-
mit the jury to infer recklessness from the foregoing 
evidence. Since there is no evidence of excessive 
speed or lack of control, the inference he would have 
us make is that the Defendant deliberately drove his 
vehicle off the side of the road, thus injuring both 
himself and his passenger, although the Record does 
not show any reason why he should so intend. 
The net effect of permitting such an inferance 
would be to allow the issue to go to the jury, or in 
other words to impose upon the Defendant the bur-
den of convincing the jury that he was not guilty 
of recklessness even though there is no evidence that 
he was. 
All of the witnesses to this accident who testi-
fied, including the Defendant, were called as the 
Plaintiff's witnesses. Presumably Plaintiff brought 
out all of the evidence which he considered advis-
able. As was stated by the trial court, he may 
have proved the Defendant guilty of simple negli-
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gence but he did not prove the Defendant to be guilty 
of recklessness, or even produce sufficient evidence 
for the case to go to the jury on this issue. Therefore, 
the directed verdict in Defendant's favor rendered 
by the trial court in this case should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CANNON & HANSON 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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